Forensic Accounting: Hidden Balance of Payments of the Philippines by Beja, Edsel, Jr
P
O
L
IT
IC
A
L
 E
C
O
N
O
M
Y
 
R
E
S
E
A
R
C
H
 IN
S
T
IT
U
T
E
 
 
Forensic Accounting: 
Hidden Balance of Payments  
of the Philippines 
 
 
Edsel Beja, Jr. 
 
March 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKINGPAPER SERIES 
Number 130 
Gordon Hall 
418 North Pleasant Street 
Amherst, MA 01002 
 
Phone: 413.545.6355 
Fax: 413.577.0261 
peri@econs.umass.edu 
www.peri.umass.edu 
Forensic Accounting  
Hidden Balance of Payments of the Philippines  
 
Edsel L. Beja, Jr. 
 
ABSTRACT   An examination of the available data between 1990 and 2005 reveals that 
the balance of payments of the Philippines does not record large amounts of international 
transactions. Unrecorded international transactions for this period amount to US$ 192 
billion (in 1995 prices). The results suggest a serious problem in the government’s 
macroeconomic management of the Philippines, and expose a weak or weakening 
capacity in the governance of international transactions.  
JEL Classification B40, B50, C82, F40, O53 
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INTRODUCTION 
The balance of payments (BOP) records the official international transactions of a country 
with the rest of the world for a given year. It presents an accounting of the inflows and 
outflows of foreign exchange. However, studies show that some international transactions 
are either unrecorded or systematically mis-recorded in the BOP, including that of the 
Philippines’ (see, e.g., Boyce and Zarsky 1988; Boyce 1993; Vos 1992; Beja 2006a; Beja 
2006b). For example, capital flight – funds that flee a country to avoid risks, uncertainties, 
or social controls – is unrecorded in the BOP, even though it implies an outflow of foreign 
exchange. Trade misinvoicing and smuggling are also unrecorded in the BOP. Unrecorded 
international transactions make the BOP inaccurate and have policy implications. 
This paper investigates the unrecorded (or hidden) components of the BOP of the 
Philippines for the period 1990-2005. The results show that the unrecorded international 
transactions have been increasing since 1990 and have reached US$ 192 billion (in 1995 
prices) by 2005. As Beja (2005) demonstrates these unrecorded transactions actually have 
nontrivial negative impacts on a country’s macroeconomic performances. He argues that 
the result in the case of the Philippines has been a lost and arguably an unrecoverable, 
opportunity to take off to a higher economic growth path, which ultimately means lower 
social welfares of the Filipinos. Nevertheless, the Philippines remains to be the weakest 
economic performer among the emerging East Asian economies.1
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The rest of the paper expounds on the hidden components of the BOP of the 
Philippines. The next two sections discuss the framework and the methodology, then the 
results are discussed, followed by their implications. The last part concludes the paper. 
 
UNHIDING THE HIDDEN 
The paper follows the standard BOP accounting procedures, wherein official inflows of 
foreign exchange are recorded as credit items (i.e., additions) and official outflows are 
recorded as debit items (i.e., subtractions).2 Because the BOP employs a double-entry 
approach, inflows (outflows) of foreign exchange have corresponding outflows (inflows). 
Unaccounted flows are recorded as errors and omissions (EO).3 Therefore, the annual 
international transactions have an overall net balance of zero. 
The standard BOP presentation has three main components: the current accounts 
(CA), the capital and financial accounts (KA), and the EO; or algebraically,4
(1)  CA + KA + EO = Overall Balance.  
A positive overall balance is called a BOP surplus; the reverse is a BOP deficit. Both 
cases need counterpart adjustments to arrive at the overall net balance of zero, 
specifically adjustments in the official settlement accounts. A BOP surplus means a net 
decrease in the financing accounts, with similar adjustments for a BOP deficit.5 Thus,  
(2)  CA + KA + EO – Financing = Overall Balance – Financing = 0. 
Since the motivations behind the unrecorded international transactions are hidden, 
calculating the figures involves forensic accounting. Once obtained, the estimated amounts 
for the unrecorded transactions are then incorporated into the BOP following the standard 
BOP accounting procedures. With the adjustments, the BOP must still have an overall net 
balance of zero. 
There are three sets of adjustments for the BOP. The first set concerns CA – trade 
misinvoicing, for instance. Import overinvoicing and export underinvoicing are the typical 
avenues for unrecorded outflows of foreign exchange. Import underinvoicing and export 
overinvoicing occur as unrecorded inflows of foreign exchange. Import underinvoicing is 
typically done to evade customs duties and trade regulations on imported goods. Export 
overinvoicing occurs when, for instance, there are incentives on export performances of 
industries like income rebates on export revenues, which result in invoice padding. In any 
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of these four cases, the trade balance is inaccurate, and hence the CA as well. 
Three steps are followed to estimate trade misinvoicing (MIS). First compute the 
export misinvoicing (DX) and import misinvoicing (DM) in the Philippines’ trade with 
its key trade partners using the equations:  
(3a) DX = PX – CIF*X;  
(3b) DM = M – CIF*PM,  
where PX is trade partners import (i.e., Philippine exports as recorded by trade partners) 
and PM is trade partners export (i.e., Philippines imports as recorded by trade partners); 
X and M, respectively, represent Philippines exports to and imports from trade partners, 
as recorded by the Philippines; and CIF is the adjustment for freight and insurance.6 
Positive DX and DM mean export underinvoicing and import overinvoicing, respectively; 
while negative DX and DM mean export overinvoicing and import underinvoicing, 
respectively.  
Next calculate the global export and import trade misinvoicing (MISX and MISM) 
by multiplying the DX and DM above with the reciprocal of the trade partners’ shares to 
the Philippines’ total exports (X_INDUS) and imports (M_INDUS), respectively: 
(4a) 
INDUSX
DXMISX
_
=  
(4a) 
INDUSM
DMMISM
_
=  
MIS is obtained as the sum of MISX and MISM. 
There is another adjustment in CA, which is for unrecorded income remittances 
(UNR). This adjustment is particularly relevant for the Philippines because of increasing 
income remittances (REM) from the expanding overseas Filipino workers. If the informal 
remittances are large, the unrecorded flows of foreign exchange are also large, so CA is 
inaccurate. UNR is obtained by extrapolating the amount using REMIT and a measure for 
unrecorded flows (UNR Index). Thus,  
(5) UNR = REM * UNR Index. 
 A second set of adjustments concerns KA (in Equation 1 above). For instance, the 
adjustments in total indebtedness due to a discovery of misrecorded or unrecorded debts 
and/or adjustments due to debt forgiveness and other relief measures are needed to obtain 
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accurate estimates of net additions to external indebtedness (CDET). Also, the impact of 
exchange rate fluctuations on debt flows is needed. Long-term debts (LTDEBT), for 
instance, are denominated in a mix of hard currencies, but exchange rate fluctuations 
affects the United States dollar (US$) valuation of debts. CDET is likewise inaccurate if 
exchange rate fluctuations are ignored. As in Boyce and Ndikumana (2001), beginning-of-
year adjusted debt (ATTD) that accounts for exchange rate fluctuations is obtained as: 
(6) ∑ ∑ −−−−− −+= i j LTDEBTFX
FXLTDEBTATTD 1ttj,
1ti,
ti,
1t1ti,1t 1βα  
        1t
1t
t
1t −
−
− ++ STDEBT
SDR
SDRIMF , 
where αi is the proportion of the long-term debts in Euros (EU), British pounds (UK), 
French francs (FF), German marks (DM), Japanese yens (Yen), and Swiss francs (SF); βi 
is the proportion of LTDEBT in US$, multiple, and other currencies; FX is the exchange 
rate between the hard currencies and US$; IMF means the use of IMF Credits; SDR is the 
exchange rate between Special Drawing Rights and US$; and STDEBT means short-term 
debts.7 All things the same, an appreciation of the hard currencies relative to US$ reduce 
FXi/FXi,t-1 and ATTDt-1. 
The adjustment factor (ADEBT) for the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on 
DEBT is calculated as: ADEBT = ATTDt-1 – DEBTt-1. Appreciation of the hard currencies 
relative to US$ make ATTDt-1 less than DEBTt-1, such that ADEBT is negative. Thus, the 
adjusted annual flow of external debt (CDETADJ) is 
(7) CDETADJ = CDET – ADEBT.  
Since CDET = DEBT – DEBTt-1, it follows that  
(8) CDETADJ = DEBT – ATTDt-1.  
CDETADJ – CDET gives an estimate for unrecorded flows of foreign exchange.  
Another adjustment in KA is for the discrepancies in the non-debt capital inflows 
(NKI), comprising of foreign direct investments (FDI) and portfolio equities investments 
plus other investment assets (PORT). The procedure is basically the same as the one 
described for CDETADJ. First, the discrepancies in FDI (PORT) data between the source 
country and the Philippines are obtained; then, the impacts of the foreign exchange 
fluctuations on the US$ valuation of FDI (PORT) are computed. Adjusted FDI (FDIADJ) 
and adjusted PORT (PORTADJ) are obtained, such that FDIADJ – FDI and PORTADJ – 
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PORT give the estimates for the unrecorded investment flows.8
Using CDETADJ, FDIADJ, and PORTADJ, the unrecorded flows of foreign exchange 
called financial flight (KF) is calculated as the residual between the adjusted recorded 
sources and the uses of funds. The sources of funds are CDETADJ and net non-debt capital 
inflows (NKIADJ), the latter including FDIADJ and PORTADJ. The uses of funds are the 
current account deficits (CAD) and net additions to international reserves (plus other uses 
of foreign exchange) (CRES).9 The EO is subtracted because it gives the official statistics 
for unrecorded international transactions; thus,  
(9) KF = CDETADJ + NKIADJ – CAD – CRES – EO. 
From Equations 4, 5, and 9, the estimated unrecorded international transactions 
are then recorded as adjustment entries in the BOP. It is initially necessary to assume that 
EO, the overall balance, and the official settlements accounts in the BOP remain constant 
to obtain estimates for other unrecorded international transactions called other counterpart 
adjustments. This latter amount is used for the third set of adjustments on EO, wherein 
the estimates of other counterpart adjustments are added to EO to obtain the adjusted EO 
(EOADJ).10  
 Raw data are taken from the World Bank’s Global Development Finance and the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics and Direction of Trade Statistics.  
 
RECORDING THE UNRECORDED 
The (official) balance of payments (BOP) of the Philippines is presented in Table 1, 
together with the estimated unrecorded international transactions. Table 1 shows a current 
account (CA) deficit of US$ 2.7 billion in 1990. The estimated unrecorded international 
transactions include US$ 1.5 billion for trade misinvoicing (MIS) and US$ 732 million 
for unrecorded remittances (UNREMIT), with a total of US$ 2.2 billion. After accounting 
for these amounts, the adjusted CA (CAADJ) in 1990 still registers a deficit of US$ 456 
million (Table 2), smaller than the official statistics. Hence, the CA is underestimated by 
about US$ 2.2 billion.  
Table 1 also shows a financial account (FA) surplus of US$ 2.1 billion in 1990. 
The estimated unrecorded international transactions for financial flight total US$ 1.1 
billion. The adjusted FA (FAADJ) in 1990 is still a surplus, but at a smaller amount of US$ 
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972 million (Table 2). The official FA is therefore overestimated by more than US$ 1 
billion. Other counterpart adjustments of US$ 1.2 billion lead to the adjusted errors and 
omissions (EOADJ) if US$ 562 million. Total unrecorded international transactions for 
1990 is US$ 4.8 billion (in 1995 prices), covering US$ 1.6 billion of trade misinvoicing, 
US$ 786 million of unrecorded remittances, US$ 1.2 billion of financial flight, and US$ 
1.2 billion of other unrecorded international transactions. 
Results indicate that by the mid 1990s, total unrecorded international transactions 
soared to extraordinary amounts (Table 2). As the Asian financial crisis started to impact 
the Philippines in 1997, financial flight and the other unrecorded international transactions 
reached a US$ 28 billion. In 1996, the two accounts already amounted to US$ 19 billion. 
In fact, the trend for financial flight suggests an increasing from 1993, when the country 
regained access to the international capital markets. The trend of unrecorded international 
transactions indicates the same direction as that of financial flight, especially after 1995. 
As the results in Table 1 indicate, trade misinvoicing increased in 1997, reaching US$ 2.8 
billion from US$ 858 million the previous year. The unrecorded remittances, however, 
has remained stable at around US$ 2 billion each year, which is expected because income 
remittances to the Philippines are relatively steady flows regardless of what happens in 
the domestic economy.  
The results for the succeeding years are interpreted in the same way. Again, with 
Table 1, the CA is at a US$ 2.4 billion surplus in 2005. The estimated unrecorded 
transactions include US$ 2.7 billion for MIS and US$ 3.1 billion for UNREMIT, with a 
total of US$ 5.8 billion. The CAADJ reports of an even bigger surplus at US$ 8.2 billion 
(Table 2). The CA in 2005 is therefore underestimated by about US$ 6 billion. The FA is 
also at a surplus of US$ 820 million in 2005. The estimated unrecorded international 
transactions for financial flight total US$ 1.9 billion, so FAADJ becomes a deficit at US$ 
1.1 billion (Table 2). Thus, FA in 2005 is overestimated by US$ 1.9 billion. With other 
counterpart adjustments of US$ 4 billion, EOADJ for 2005 is US$ 4.7 billion. In 2005 
alone, total amount of unrecorded international transactions is US$ 11 billion (in 1995 
prices), covering US$ 2.6 billion of trade misinvoicing, US$ 2.9 billion of unrecorded 
remittances, US$ 1.8 billion of financial flight, and US$ 3.7 billion of other unrecorded 
international transactions. 
TABLE 1: Balance of Payments of the Philippines, 1990-2005 (US$ Millions) 
 
 
    
MAIN ACCOUNTS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Current Accounts -2,695 -1,034 -1,000 -3,016 -2,950 -1,980 -3,953 -4,351 
Capital Accounts 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Financial Accounts 2,057 2,927 3,208 3,267 5,120 5,309 11,277 6,498 
Errors and Omissions 593 -138 -520 85 157 -2,094 -2,986 -5,241 
Overall Balance -45 1,755 1,689 336 2,327 1,235 4,338 -3,094 
Net Financing 45 -1,755 -1,689 -336 -2,327 -1,235 -4,338 3,094 
UNRECORDED TRANSACTIONS                 
Trade Misinvoicing 1,507 2,300 821 560 2,507 1,632 858 2,766 
Unreported Remittances 732 925 1,268 1,164 1,553 2,412 1,950 2,720 
Financial Flight -1,085 -2,007 -3,740 -2,642 -4,021 -6,703 -10,913 -16,713 
Other Counterpart Adjustments -1,154 -1,217 1,651 918 -40 2,659 8,105 11,228 
         
         
Table 1 continued…                 
MAIN ACCOUNTS 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Current Accounts 1,546 7,219 6,258 1,323 4,383 1,396 2,080 2,354 
Capital Accounts 0 -8 38 -12 -19 23 -23 40 
Financial Accounts 483 -2,250 -4,042 -745 -2,399 -1,716 -2,977 820 
Errors and Omissions -750 -1,311 -2,630 -270 -2,076 218 -667 -807 
Overall Balance 1,279 3,650 -376 296 -111 -79 -1,587 2,407 
Net Financing -1,279 -3,650 376 -296 111 79 1,587 -2,407 
UNRECODED TRANSACTIONS                 
Trade Misinvoicing -540 1,412 4,752 2,847 3,799 2,632 3,159 2,736 
Unreported Remittances 2,052 2,108 2,118 2,702 2,582 2,728 3,078 3,073 
Financial Flight -3,624 -6,683 -7,706 -2,637 -6,050 -2,391 -3,332 -1,882 
Other Counterpart Adjustments 2,112 3,163 836 -2,912 -331 -2,969 -2,905 -3,927 
Sources of raw data: Global Development Finance; International Financial Statistics; Direction of Trade Statistics 
Note: Calculations of the author. 
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TABLE 2: Balance of Payments of the Philippines, Adjusted, 1990-2005 (US$ Millions) 
   
MAIN ACCOUNTS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Current Accounts, adj. -456 2,191 1,089 -1,292 1,111 2,064 -1,145 1,134 
Capital Accounts, adj. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Financial Accounts 972 920 -532 625 1,099 -1,394 364 -10,215 
Errors and Omissions, adj. -562 -1,355 1,131 1,003 117 566 5,119 5,986 
Overall Balance -45 1,755 1,689 336 2,327 1,235 4,338 -3,094 
Net Financing 45 -1,755 -1,689 -336 -2,327 -1,235 -4,338 3,094 
UNRECORDED TRANSACTIONS (Table 1)                 
Total Unrecorded Transactions 4,478 6,449 7,480 5,284 8,121 13,407 21,826 33,426 
Total Unrecorded Transactions (1995 Prices) 4,806 6,906 7,963 5,544 8,412 13,407 21,325 32,681 
         
         
Table continued…                 
MAIN ACCOUNTS 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Current Accounts, adj. 3,058 10,739 13,128 6,872 10,764 6,756 8,317 8,163 
Capital Accounts 0 -8 38 -12 -19 23 -23 40 
Financial Accounts, adj. -3,141 -8,933 -11,748 -3,382 -8,449 -4,107 -6,309 -1,062 
Errors and Omissions, adj. 1,362 1,852 -1,793 -3,182 -2,407 -2,751 -3,572 -4,734 
Overall Balance 1,279 3,650 -376 296 -111 -79 -1,587 2,407 
Net Financing -1,279 -3,650 376 -296 111 79 1,587 -2,407 
UNRECORDED TRANSACTIONS (Table 1)                 
Total Unrecorded Transactions 8,329 13,367 15,412 11,098 12,763 10,720 12,475 11,619 
Total Unrecorded Transactions (1995 Prices) 8,350 13,290 14,486 10,318 12,144 10,080 11,731 10,968 
Note: Calculations of the author.         
 
For the period 1990-2005, total unrecorded transactions is US$ 192 billion, of 
which US$ 34 billion is trade misinvoicing, US$ 32 billion is unrecorded remittances, 
US$ 81 billion is financial flight, and US$ 45 billion is other unrecorded international 
transactions. Thus, on the average, the Philippines experiences US$ 2 billion of trade 
misinvoicing and unrecorded remittances, US$ 5 billion of financial flight, and another 
US$ 2.8 billion of other unrecorded flows each year. From Table 2, the trend in total 
unrecorded international transactions since 2000 is in the range of US$ 10 to US$ 14.5 
billion each year. In any case, the results reveal that large amounts remain unrecorded in 
the BOP. If these are employed in the Philippines, they can contribute to enlarging the 
productive activities in the country. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
Tables 1 and 2 reveal that large amounts of unrecorded international transactions remain 
hidden from the balance of payments (BOP) of the Philippines. The tables also show that 
unrecorded international transactions are large and have been increasing since the 1990s. 
The deregulation and liberalization of the economy, coupled with the weak or weakening 
capacity in the governance of international transactions, create opportunities for trade 
misinvoicing, unrecorded remittances, financial flight, and other unrecorded transactions. 
Along with the weak or weakening capacity, are the increasing volumes and volatilities 
of trade and finance that not only contribute to enlarging the unrecorded international 
transactions, but also further undermine what was left of the government’s capacity to 
regulate the international transactions. Moreover, the current situation shows the severity 
of unrecorded international transactions as they are not only destabilizing the domestic 
macroeconomy, but are also posing as threats to government actions aimed at reinstituting 
measures to manage resource flows. These opportunities for unrecorded transactions are 
consequently well-exploited and ignored by the government. 
The results point to some fundamental problems with regard to the government’s 
capacity to manage the macroeconomy, especially its capability to regulate international 
transactions. As such, it is difficult to direct, say, investments into productive domestic 
endeavors to enlarge output and create more employment, thereby supporting domestic 
industrialization and realizing broad-based macroeconomic performances. In addition, the 
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unrecorded international transactions point to other fundamental problems that remain 
unaddressed by the government, among of which are: a prevailing disinterest to undertake 
domestic investments, large underutilized domestic productive capacities, malfunctioning 
bureaucracy, widespread corruption, unending domestic political crises, quick reversals 
in policies, and the absence of an autonomous political base to carry out the government’s 
programs. Such issues reinforce prevailing concerns that current political survival has 
compromised the direction of policies; at the same time, they strengthened doubts about 
the Philippines’ ability to sustain macroeconomic recovery and, in the end, improve the 
social conditions of the Filipinos. Thus, resource flows are likely to be short-term and to 
be going into speculative (e.g., stock market and real estate) and non-productive activities 
(e.g., consumption binges), which fuel financial and asset bubbles, encourage risky 
investment behavior, and produce economic crises like the 1997-98 Asian crisis. 
Additionally, more funds end up being misallocated as resource flows increase to take 
advantage of the situation. Given the nature of the crises, macroeconomic conditions are 
further undermined, worsening the reductions in domestic investments, intensifying the 
domestic uncertainties, and so on. Crises are extended in such a case and the social costs 
are magnified.  
Even when the macroeconomic conditions indicate that robust performances can 
be maintained, increasing resource flows end up contributing to increasing the unrecorded 
international transactions. The bigger amounts of unrecorded transactions are more 
difficult to control. In fact, the government misjudges the increasing resource flows as a 
vote of confidence to the state-of-affairs or fails to notice the increasing unrecorded 
international transactions. More seriously, the government concludes that its withdrawal 
from macroeconomic management and disregard of unrecorded international transactions 
are on the right direction. Getting rid of existing governance mechanisms and rules over 
international transactions must be reconsideration and adjustments on them must be made 
with prudence considering that the unrecorded transactions have serious consequences on 
the domestic economy.   
There is therefore a need to rethink the direction of policies in the Philippines – to 
reconsider macroeconomic management and regulation of international transactions. An 
important step in this direction is a reapplication of capital management and related 
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techniques designed to strengthen the government’s capacities, including its administrative 
capabilities for managing the macroeconomy and regulating resource flows (see, e.g., 
Rodrik 1998; Palma 2000; Stiglitz 2002; Epstein et al. 2005). Such techniques must not 
be seen as a return to economic repression; rather, they must be seen as mechanisms that 
enable the government to regain its control over the direction of policies, especially in 
disciplining speculative and unproductive activities. Such techniques provide the needed 
space for the government to design programs that are appropriate given the domestic 
realities and characteristics, especially in pursuing robust macroeconomic performances, 
in enlarging opportunities, and in raising the social welfares of people. Concerns such as 
an unsustainable current account deficit, an unsound fiscal deficit and debt management, 
an unstable inflation, uncompetitive foreign exchange rates, interest rates that discourage 
savings intermediation, an environment that is unfavorable for domestic investments, and 
so on, still remain to be important concerns and have to be addressed by the government. 
Accompanying them must be crucial programs that strengthen the government’s macro-
organizational fundamentals, covering aspects like enhanced institutional capacities to 
negotiate internal and external challenges to policy making, sound structures for effective 
implementation of programs, availability of reliable economic information, and so on. In 
other words, in a context where deregulation and liberalization programs have been 
introduced, it is imperative that the government introduce compensating policies to catch 
up with the rapid changes in the economic setting, the innovations brought about by 
information technology, and so on, with building up of the capacities of the bureaucracy. 
The enhanced capacities in both the collection and processing of economic information, 
for example, is the same as tightening regulatory mechanisms of the government and it 
sustains the trend towards increasing prudential macroeconomic management. Therefore, 
re-regulatory actions are needed. Effective governance means that the government is in 
the center of macroeconomic management and policy making.  
Philippine policy makers must therefore reconsider the implications posed by 
large unrecorded international transactions and introduce appropriate measures to reverse 
the situation. It is important that policy makers are made aware of what is happening in 
the country – even though there are no apparent signs of an economic crisis, for instance, 
or even if they do not like what they hear. Philippine policy makers have to realize that 
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there are serious consequences if they do not act or if they act incorrectly. Indeed, an 
important lesson from past crises is that policy mistakes have serious negative 
consequences on the country and that it is more sensible to take a precautionary stance 
even when the macroeconomy is doing well. Recent strong macroeconomic performances 
can mislead policy makers to think that their under or non-regulation of international 
transactions is vindicated by the increasing resource flows, so the government must 
continue to withdraw from managing the macroeconomy and regulating international 
transactions. Renewed confidence on the Philippines after years of being passed over by 
international finance can also propel policy makers to a mania of catching up, which is 
dangerous, given that the economy has been largely deregulated and liberalized and that 
the government’s capacity is weak or has been weakened. With a liberalized economy, 
and given a weak regulatory capacity, crises are inevitable regardless how policy makers 
respond to increased resource flows (see, e.g., Jomo 1998; Montes 1998; Palma 2003). 
Interestingly, policy makers do not or cannot see the problem or they do but incredibly 
fail to address the problem. The weak or weakened governance capacity means that 
unrecorded international transactions are going to be tolerated or disregarded by the 
government. Unless there are fundamental changes in the way the government sees the 
problems, and acts on them, the situation will remain unaddressed.  
 
CONCLUSION 
An examination of the Balance of Payments (BOP) of the Philippines was undertaken to 
determine the magnitude of unrecorded international transactions. Using available data 
from the World Bank’s and the IMF’s databases, the results show that large amounts of 
resources flows remain hidden from the BOP of the Philippines, amounting to US$ 192 
billion (in 1995 prices) for the period 1990-2005. Results also show that the magnitude of 
unrecorded international transactions has been increasing, and they point to a problem in 
the direction of the government’s macroeconomic management of the country. The results 
point to a weak or weakening capacity in the governance of international transactions. 
After the Philippines embarked on deregulation and liberalization programs, the 
government failed to strengthen its regulatory apparatus. The ensuing resource flows are 
seen as a vote of confidence on the macroeconomy and a vindication of the government’s 
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withdrawal from macroeconomic management and regulation of international 
transactions. As a result, policy makers are encouraged to carry out further deregulation 
and liberalization and to remove the government from being pro-actively involved in the 
economy. With a weak or weakened capacity to regulate international transactions, more 
opportunities are available for trade misinvoicing, unreported remittances, financial 
flight, and other unrecorded transactions, and indeed they have been exploited quite well. 
Crises of course can reinforce this trend. It is now necessary to revisit capital 
management and related techniques to strengthen the government’s capacities to regain 
its control of the macroeconomy and to regulate international transactions.  
Lastly, it is important to challenge the government with unsympathetic criticisms, 
even to the extent of condemning the current direction of policies and governance to 
“open its eyes” to the need to have sound governance of resource flows but not revert to 
economic repression. It is also important to challenge the government to rethink about 
reforms to reduce internal and external shocks vulnerabilities, establish its autonomy, and 
maintain an effective political base to carry out its programs. Such an advocacy is needed 
towards a more careful analysis of the alternatives for the Philippines. Unless the 
government responds pro-actively to consider the alternatives, it is condemning the 
Philippines to the perpetuity of crises: the continuity of narrow, shallow, and hollow 
macroeconomic performances, and the permanence of poverty of the Filipinos. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 Emerging East Asian economies comprise the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs). Taiwan 
(Province of China), Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, and South Korea comprise the first tier NIEs; 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand comprise the second tier NIEs; and Vietnam 
and China comprise the third tier NIEs. 
2 See IMF (1996) for details on the BOP accounting. 
3 “In practice [  ], the accounts frequently do not balance. Data for balance of payments [are] often 
derived independently from different sources; as a result, there may be a summary of net credits 
or net debits (i.e., net errors and omissions in the accounts). […] Because inaccurate or missing 
estimates may be offsetting, the size of the [errors and omissions] cannot be taken as an 
indicator of the relative accuracy of the balance of payments [  ]” (IMF 1996; p. 6). Errors and 
omissions can occur in the process of compilation. If that is the case, the size of errors and 
omissions will be stable or minimal and will not exhibit any pattern. 
4 The current accounts refer to “transactions (other than those in the financial items that involve 
economic values and occur between resident and nonresident entities. Also covered are of sets 
to economic values provided or acquired without a quid pro quo. Specifically, major 
classifications [are:] goods and services, income, and current transfers” (IMF 1996; p. 38). The 
capital accounts include the following items: “(i) capital transfers and (ii) acquisition or disposal 
of nonproduced, nonfinancial assets” (IMF 1996; p. 77). Capital account items are different 
from current transfers. Financial accounts include items like “financial assets [and investments] 
including the claims of nonresidents [; that is, the foreign liabilities of the economy or] 
indebtedness to nonresidents (IMF 1996; p. 78). “The convention [is that] ownership of some 
nonfinancial assets [is] construed as ownership of financial assets” (IMF 1996; p. 78). Note that 
“the reinvested earnings of a direct investment enterprise (which accrue to a direct investor in 
proportion to participation in the equity of the enterprise) are recorded in the current accounts [ 
… ] as paid to the direct investor as investment income on equity and in the financial accounts 
as being reinvested in the enterprise” (IMF 1996; p. 78). 
5 BOP Financing covers the following items: Use of International Foreign Reserves, Exceptional 
Financing, Short-term External Borrowings, and/or the Use of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Credits.  
6 Trade data between the Philippines and its industrialized-country trading-partners are used in all 
the calculations. The rationale of this approach is that information from industrialized countries 
is expected to be more reliable compared to the data from the developing-countries-trading-
partners. 
7 Because the currency composition of MULT, OTHER, and STDEBT are not available, their 
dollar valuations remain unadjusted. 
8 Because the currency composition of FDI and PORT are not available, their dollar valuations 
remain unadjusted. 
9 CRES includes the foreign exchange adjustments on currency and other asset holdings. 
10 Calculations do not cover all types of unrecorded international transactions. Illegal transactions 
(e.g., money laundering) are not covered in the calculations. It can be argued that the 
adjustments introduced in the BOP are minimum adjustments.  
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